Requesting treasury funds to establish additional DAOs sets a problematic precedent.

DAOs, in principle, contradict their intended purpose of decentralizing governance by often consolidating voting power among a few dominant groups. Their current existence stems from unresolved issues like identity verification and uncapped voting per wallet. Once these challenges are addressed, DAOs will likely become obsolete—or at least should—since they’re more of a temporary patch preventing treasury exploitation by bad actors rather than a solution to the root problem.

Increasing the number of DAOs introduces greater complexity and discourages broader participation in OpenGov. For users outside DAOs, the cost of transaction fees becomes harder to justify when their individual votes hold minimal influence.

Furthermore, most existing DAOs tend to operate as echo chambers, reacting impulsively to public sentiment or the preferences of one or two influential figures. While some might argue otherwise, this pattern is evident from even brief observations in the Discord channels of various DAOs.

Daniel has been on AAG, several times and is dedicated to the ecosystem.
Aye
~flipchan